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This paper investigates possible non-linearities in the response of bank lending to 
monetary policy shocks in the euro area. The credit market is modelled over the period 
1985-2005 by means of an Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model (AVECM) involving 
four endogenous variables (loans to the private sector, real GDP, lending rate, and consumer 
price index) and one exogenous variable (money market rate). The main features of the 
model are the existence of two cointegrating equations representing the long-run credit 
demand and supply and the possibility for loading and lagged term coefficients to assume 
different values depending on the monetary policy regime (easing or tightening). The paper 
finds that the effect on credit, GDP and prices of a monetary policy tightening is larger 
than the effect of a monetary policy easing. This result supports the existence of an asymmetric 
broad credit channel in the euro area. 
JEL classification: C32, C51, E44, E52. 
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1 
There is a widespread consensus among economists and policy-makers on the leading 
indicator properties of credit regarding medium-term prospects for output and inflation.
2 The 
role of credit in the conduct of monetary policy is in fact emphasized by the practice of 
several central banks of including credit in their information set. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) explicitly considers credit in both pillars of its monetary policy strategy as “given the 
particular importance of bank loans for the financing of euro area firms, developments in 
such loans may have important implications for euro area-wide economic activity” (ECB, 
2004). The Federal Reserve, too, assigns a special role to credit as “policymakers continue to 
use monetary and credit data as a source of information about the state of the economy” 
(Bernanke, 2006). Both central banks use the Bank Lending Survey to obtain detailed 
information on developments in financial conditions.  
From a theoretical perspective, the role of the credit market in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy is emphasized by authors adhering to the credit view. 
Although the credit channel was studied by Hawtrey, Hahn, Keynes and other authors of the 
“Swedish School” in the 1930s, the debate about its relevance has been re-opened by the 
work of Bernanke and Blinder (1988). According to these two authors the credit market is 
characterized by imperfect substitutability between bank loans and privately-issued debt. 
Indeed, where some borrowers do not have access to the capital markets (not only 
households, but even small firms), their spending and investment decisions must rely 
exclusively on the availability of bank credit and self-financing: in such a case, every change 
in the composition of bank assets would influence both the level and the distribution of 
private expenditure for consumption and investment.  
                                                           
1 We would like to thank Alessandro Calza, David Marqués Ibanez, Alessandro Secchi and one anonymous 
referee for helpful comments. We also thank the participants at the Bank of Italy’s Regional Economics 
seminar and at the 2007 ESEM conference held in Budapest. The usual disclaimer applies. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of 
Italy. E-mail addresses: leonardo.gambacorta@bancaditalia.it; carlotta.rossi@bancaditalia.it. 
2 See, amongst others, Stock and Watson (1999), Friedman and Kuttner (1993), Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 
(1993) for the US and Nicoletti-Altimari (2001) and Calza et al. (2006) for the euro area. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2003) demonstrate that lending conditions help us to understand two recent historical episodes: the 
East Asian financial crisis and the 1991 US recession and subsequent recovery and boom.  
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Within the credit view, two transmission channels have received most attention: the 
“bank lending channel” (BLC) and the “balance sheet channel” (BSC). The BLC claims that 
a monetary tightening affects bank loans because the drop in reservable deposits cannot be 
completely offset by issuing other forms of funding (i.e. uninsured CDs or bonds; for an 
opposite view see Romer and Romer, 1990) or by liquidating some assets. Kashyap and 
Stein (1995, 2000), Stein (1998), Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Ehrmann et al. (2003) claim 
that the market for bank debt is imperfect. Since non-reservable liabilities are not insured 
and there is an asymmetric information problem about the value of banks’ assets, a “lemon’s 
premium” is paid to investors. According to these authors, small, low-liquid and low-
capitalized banks pay a higher premium because the market perceives them to be more risky. 
Since these banks are more exposed to asymmetric information problems, they are less able 
to shield their credit relationships in the event of a monetary tightening, and they should cut 
their supplied loans by a larger amount. Moreover, they have less capacity to issue bonds 
and CDs and could therefore try to contain the drain of deposits by raising their rates further.  
Loan supply shifts could also originate from a “balance sheet channel”, working 
through the relative prices of the guarantees provided to banks (Mishkin, 1995; Oliner and 
Rodebusch, 1996; Kashyap and Stein, 1997): a monetary squeeze increases debt service 
costs which can prompt sales of real assets, reducing their value and causing a loss of 
creditworthiness and a reduction of lending. In this situation there is a greater incentive for 
banks to finance less risky projects and to start a “flight to quality” (Lang and Nakamura, 
1995). The “financial accelerator hypothesis” (Bernanke and  Gertler, 1989; Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996) reinforces this mechanism, claiming that a monetary policy 
tightening, by reducing the net worth of borrowers, increases the premium on external 
finance required by lenders, thus reducing borrowers’ ability to invest. These mechanisms 
are amplified if loan demand also responds to changes in monetary policy and output 
asymmetrically, due to a differential effect on investment decisions and self-financing 
(Friedman and Kuttner, 1993). In this case a “broad credit channel” is identified because 
both supply and demand schedules move asymmetrically in response to a monetary change.  
A natural implication of the credit view is that the pass-through of monetary policy 
shocks to output and inflation may be asymmetric. From a theoretical perspective, there are 
various ways of rationalizing the non-linear behaviour of credit markets in the case of  
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monetary policy changes. The most obvious one is the outright assumption that the loan 
supply curve has some form of rigidity. The first example is the model of Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) in which an adverse selection problem leads to a backward bending supply of credit 
and a consequent credit rationing on the upside. Blinder (1987) builds a model in which 
monetary policy shocks have different effects when the economy is in a credit rationing 
regime with respect to other more accommodative regimes. McCallum (1991) finds evidence 
that the credit-rationing mechanism exists and that it helps to explain the fact that in the US, 
during the 1980s, the output effect of money shocks was about twice as large in monetary 
policy tightening than in easing. 
Asymmetric behaviour may also be detected even if no rationing à la Stiglitz and 
Weiss is detected and loan supply always matches loan demand. For example, considering 
the BLC mechanism, we may think that, due to capital regulation, it is impossible for a bank 
to further increase the supply of new loans in the case of a monetary easing. This is because 
it is necessary to maintain a certain proportion between bank capital and lending. This 
rigidity does not apply in the case of a monetary tightening, and a reduction in economic 
activity is usually associated with a drop in loan demand. In this case the reduction of 
supplied credit frees up capital requirements and makes it possible to cover any losses. De 
Long and Summers (1988) interpret the asymmetric mechanism in a different way, claiming 
that “banks can either remain healthy or they can fail. If banks fail there are negative 
macroeconomic ramifications but there are no corresponding possibilities on the positive 
side”. 
Non-linear dynamics are also detected in the “balance sheet channel” and the 
“financial accelerator theory”. For example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) stress 
that changes in credit market conditions amplify and propagate the effects of initial real or 
monetary shocks thus explaining the small shocks/large cycles puzzle. The intrinsically non-
linear nature of the financial accelerator theory is also strengthened by moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems that amplify the effect of a monetary policy shock via credit 
more in a recession than during a boom. 
In this paper we examine empirically whether credit in the euro area reacts non-
linearly to monetary policy shocks. This topic is particularly critical for the euro area  
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economy in virtue of the importance of bank financing. At the end of 2005 the total amount 
of bank lending to euro area households and firms amounted to 114 per cent of GDP, 
compared with 58 per cent in the US. Even if empirical findings support the existence of a 
“credit channel” in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area (see 
Angeloni et al., 2003, for a survey) all the studies have been performed using linear 
regressions or linear autoregressions (VAR) that may not detect non-linearities in the credit 
market as depicted in the credit view literature. Therefore, the main novelty of this paper lies 
in the test for asymmetric adjustment of bank loans, real GDP and prices in the event of 
opposite monetary policy impulses (tightening or easing). The econometric framework used 
is the Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model (AVECM) as in Lim (2001). This is based 
on a reformulation of the multivariate error correction model proposed by Johansen (1988; 
1995), which allows for asymmetric behaviour both in the long and in the short run. In 
particular, the model captures the interplay of long-run relationships (a loan demand and a 
loan supply), embedded in the cointegration vectors, with their short-run adjustments 
captured by the part in first difference.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on the 
modelling of credit to the private sector in the euro area. Section 3 gives a descriptive 
analysis of the data and identifies possible breaks in the estimation period. After an 
examination of the characteristics of the VAR model in Section 4, Section 5 discusses the 
long-run relationship between bank lending, GDP, consumer prices and interest rates using 
Johansen’s methodology. Section 6 presents the Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model 
used to test for the presence of asymmetric behaviour depending on whether policy rates are 
increasing or decreasing. Model specification tests are reported in Section 7, while Section 8 
contains the results of a simulation using the estimated AVECM. The last section 
summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. Modelling credit to the private sector  
Notwithstanding the great practical importance of bank lending in economic activity, 
only recently has economic literature started to investigate the characteristics of the credit 
market. Although the first empirical works on bank lending  date back to the early 1930s  
 
7
(Tinbergen, 1937), for the next 50 years, research was devoted mainly to the study of 
demand for money, as credit was considered only the mirror image of monetary aggregates 
(Fase, 1995).  
The “credit view” critique to the money-credit equivalence, as well as the growing 
difficulty of controlling money supply, have re-awakened interest in the relationship 
between credit and money and in the role of bank credit as an intermediate monetary target 
(ECB, 2006).  
Since the early 1990s, modelling credit to the private sector has been the subject of a 
fast growing strand of empirical literature. Empirical works for the euro area countries 
analyse credit to households, credit to firms or credit to the private sector as a whole. Table 1 
summarizes the most recent empirical works for the euro area.  
There exist a disagreement in this literature concerning the role of the supply side of 
the credit market. The majority of work focuses on the demand side of the credit market 
under the assumption that the supply effects are limited (in line with the money view). 
According to the credit view, however, monetary policy affects the real economy by shifting 
the supply schedule of credit, and the overall effects of the BLC and BSC are considered to 
work in addition to the traditional interest rate channel. Several studies have attempted to 
disentangle the different channels by focusing on cross-sectional differences between 
banks.
3 This literature, however, does not analyse the macroeconomic impact of the BLC on 
loans but claims that the existence of such a channel is proved by the different response of 
lending supply among banks. From a macro perspective, few studies have tried to gain 
insight into the identification issue by modelling separately credit demand and credit supply 
equilibrium within a conventional Vector Error Correction Model (Huelsewig, 2003 and 
Kakes, 2000). Such a framework is very interesting as it sheds light on the role of the credit 
market in a macroeconomic set-up. 
                                                           
3 This strategy relies on the hypothesis that certain bank-specific characteristics (for example, size, liquidity 
and capitalization) influence loan supply movements, while banks’ loan demand is independent of these 
features. For a review of the literature on the distributional effects of the BLC see, amongst others, Altunbas et 
al. (2002), Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta (2005).  
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As already mentioned in the previous section, the BLC and the BSC work with non-
linear mechanisms. A very recent strand of literature analyses the role of credit as a non-
linear propagator of shocks (Balke, 2000 for the US, Atanasova, 2003 for the UK, Calza and 
Sousa, 2006 for the euro area). These authors generally employ a VAR model including 
output, inflation, credit, and a policy rate. The focus is on the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on output and inflation, allowing VAR coefficients to vary depending on the credit 
market regime (high lending rate or low lending rate regimes). The credit market is therefore 
the transition variable and the main conclusion of the literature is that the size of the impact 
of a temporary policy shock on output and inflation differs according to the credit regime.  
In this paper we examine the non-linear nature of the credit market from a different 
perspective. According to the credit view, in fact, credit is likely to react directly in a non-
linear way to different types of policy shocks (easing or tightening). We therefore analyse, 
by means of an Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model, the reaction of credit, output 
and inflation to positive or negative policy shocks, assuming the monetary policy rate as the 
transition variable. In other words, we allow credit not only to capture the asymmetric 
propagation of monetary policy but also to react directly to policy shocks in a non-linear 
way. 
3. Data description 
This study is based on quarterly data for the euro area over the period 1985:1 to 
2005:4. The interaction between the credit market and economic activity is analysed by 
means of the following variables: credit to the private sector (c), real GDP (y), the consumer 
price index (p), the average lending rate (l), and the monetary policy interest rate (i).  
Given the lack of historical data on euro area MFI holdings of private sector securities, 
we restrict the analysis of credit to data on bank loans to the private sector,
4 which account 
for over 90 per cent of total credit. We use seasonally adjusted aggregate data for the EU-12 
                                                           
4 Loans to euro area residents excluding general government and MFIs. They include: loans to non-financial 
corporations, households, insurance corporations, pension funds and other financial intermediaries.  
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countries provided by the ECB from 1996; for previous years we have reconstructed 
backward the series by aggregating national data. 
The real GDP series is the one compiled by Eurostat for the EU-12 countries for the 
period 1990:4 to 2005:4. For the period 1985:1 to 1990:3 the series has been reconstructed 
backwards by aggregating national data. A graphical analysis of the behaviour of annual 
percentage changes in GDP and credit is reported in Figure 1. It shows a high correlation 
between the series, suggesting the possibility that they are cointegrated. 
Better economic conditions usually increase the number of projects becoming 
profitable in terms of expected net present value and hence increase the demand for credit 
(Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993). This calls for the presence of a long-run relationship 
between credit and GDP. However, as stressed by Friedman and Kuttner (1993), the impact 
of business cycles on consumption and investment may also be countercyclical due to a self-
financing effect that reduces the proportion of bank debt. 
The seasonally adjusted consumer price index is calculated by the OECD. Figure 2 
shows that the spike in nominal credit growth in the late 1980s may be due, at least in part, 
to the high inflation rate. Nominal lending is probably positively correlated with the price 
index, and the hypothesis of homogeneity between the two variables will be formally tested 
in the econometric section. 
The composite lending rate is obtained weighting bank lending rates on different types 
of loans (e.g. loans to enterprises of different maturity, consumer credit, and loans for house 
purchase). The weights are given by the relative importance of the corresponding loan 
category and derived from data on the stock of MFI loans to non-financial firms and 
households. The ECB data cover only the period 2003-2005; for the previous years we use 
the composite lending rate reconstructed by Calza et al. (2006) using an aggregation of 
statistics on national interest rates available on the BIS database and that of the IMF, 
weighted according to the relative importance of each country. From 1994 the monetary 
policy interest rate is given by the 3-month euribor rate provided by the ECB. Prior to that 
time it is reconstructed by aggregating national data. The behaviour of the composite lending 
rate and of the monetary policy indicator clearly shows the two series to be cointegrated 
(Figure 3). However, there is a break in the difference between the two series l-i (the mark- 
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up) that typically captures both credit risk and structural characteristics of the lending market 
(Figure 4). In other words, the mark-up tends to increase if, other things being equal, 
borrowers become more risky or if conditions on the credit market alter. Examples may be 
changes in credit supply towards forms of credit that are less guaranteed or more short-term. 
The increase in the mark-up occurred from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the first 
quarter of 1995. During this period - characterized by the EMS crisis, a drop in real GDP 
and stock market capitalization - the quality of bank lending decreased sharply. A large 
number of firms defaulted and the delinquency rate for consumer credit peaked. All these 
elements point to a change in the risk component in the mark-up towards a new equilibrium 
level. 
In order to control for possible changes in the mark-up due to the maturity composition 
of bank credit, we analyse only short-term loans. The first panel of Figure 5 plots the 
difference between the interest rate on short-term credit and the money market rate for the 
four main euro area countries and for the area as a whole. Two facts are worth mentioning. 
First, the increase in the mark-up in the period 1992-95 is still valid, supporting the idea that 
the increase in the mark-up for the composite lending rate is not influenced by changes in the 
composition of bank credit towards shorter maturities. Second, the increase in the mark-up 
was more pronounced in France and Germany, where the drop in the quality of credit and in 
bank profitability was particularly large. The second part of Figure 5 shows, on the other 
hand, that the mark-down, the difference between the monetary policy indicator and the 
interest rate on deposits, declined substantially in all the major euro area countries. This 
indicates that conditions applied to depositors have improved, probably due to greater 
competition in the deposit market. The third part of Figure 5 traces the evolution of the 
spread between the interest rate on short-term lending and that on deposits (the sum of the 
mark-up and the mark-down), which is usually used as a rough proxy for competition in the 
credit market. There is a downward trend in all the countries considered from the early 
1990s on, pointing to an overall increase in competition on the credit market. 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests provided in Table 2 clearly show that all 
the series are I(1) without drift.  
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4. The VAR model 
We start with a five-variable VAR system in which all variables are treated as 
endogenous. The starting point of the multivariate analysis is therefore: 
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where zt=[c, y, l, p, i] and ε t is a vector of white noise residuals. The deterministic part of 
the model includes a constant. 
In choosing the lag length of the VAR (p) several different criteria are used. The 
classical  LR tests (with a small sample correction suggested by Sims, 1980) and the 
information criteria (Akaike and Hannan-Quinn) provide evidence in favour of a model with 
three lags (see Table 3). The analysis of the system shows serially uncorrelated residuals. 
However, normality of the VAR is not achieved: the residual plot indicates that the non-
normality could be attributable to an outlier in the equation for credit. 
The introduction of a point dummy for the second quarter of 1990 that takes into 
account developments in German bank loans after unification, favours an improvement in 
the stochastic properties of the model, which reach a normal residual distribution (Table 4). 
5. Cointegration properties of the variables 
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where dum90 represents the point dummy. The constant is included in the cointegration 
space.  
This framework can be used to apply Johansen’s trace test to verify the order of 
integration of the matrix Π. In fact, the rank of Π determines the number of cointegrating  
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vectors (r) such that α is an nr × matrix of loading coefficients and β is an nr ×  matrix of 
cointegrating vectors.  
The results are reported in the first part of Table 5. The asymptotic critical values of 
the Johansen’s trace test have been calculated according to Johansen and Nielsen (1993) in 
order to deal with the presence of dummy variables. Johansen’s cointegration rank statistics 
show the presence of two cointegrating relationships in the model. The existence of two 
cointegrating vectors allows us to test for the presence of a long-run relationship for credit 
demand and credit supply.  
As suggested by Pesaran and Smith (1998), we check whether all the variables 
included in the model can be considered genuinely endogenous: the use of a Vector 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag with exogenous variables offers a more parsimonious 
framework than a simple VAR when all variables are jointly considered endogenous. The 
tests reported in Table 6 show that, according to economic theory, only the monetary policy 
rate can be considered weakly exogenous (p-value of 11 per cent). We therefore modify the 
model in the following way: 
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t t t t   (3) 
where xt=[c, y, l, p]. This allows us to save degrees of freedom and to simplify the structure 
of the model. 
Starting from model (3), we impose the existence of two cointegrating vectors (r=2), 
interpreting them as a credit demand and a credit supply. 
Loan demand should be a positive function of real GDP and prices and a negative 
function of the composite lending rate. In other words, we suppose the existence of a log-
linear long run relationship of the type  c=β1,1 y+β1,2 l+β1,3 p, in which the hypothesis of 
homogeneity between loans and prices may be tested for β1,3=1. 
As for loan supply, economic theory on oligopolistic (and perfect) competition 
suggests that in the long run the lending rate should be related to the monetary policy rate  
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that represents the cost of banks’ refinancing. For example, Freixas and Rochet (1997) show 
that in a model of imperfect competition among N banks each one sets its lending rate as the 
sum of the exogenous money market rate and a constant mark-up. The supply schedule is of 





*) ( ' + =γ µ  is constant. The mark-up µ is influenced by risk and 
constant marginal cost of intermediation on lending  c γ  and by the elasticity of the loan 
demand function evaluated at the optimum (c
* is the amount of credit at the equilibrium). It 
is worth noting that in the case of perfect competition (N→∞) the last part of µ goes to zero 
and the mark-up is only influenced by marginal costs and the risk component. 
As discussed in the previous section, the mark-up is not constant in our sample period. 
Figure 4 shows that µ is stationary in 1985-1992 and in 1995-2005 but it exhibits a trend in 
the period 1993-1994. In order to make the mark-up interpretable we therefore allow the 
constant in the cointegrating space to assume different values over the two sub-periods 
1985:1-1992:3 and 1995:1-2005:4. Moreover, we replace the constant with a time trend for 
the period that goes from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the last quarter to 1994 in order to 
approximate the catching up process towards the new equilibrium. 
The normalized cointegrating relationships are presented in the second part of Table 5. 
The set of overidentified restrictions, including the test for price homogeneity in the loan 
demand equation (β1,3=1), is accepted with a p-value of 7 per cent.  
As for the estimated coefficients, the long-run elasticity between lending and GDP, 
β1,1, is equal to 1.3, which is consistent with Calza et al. (2006) who obtain a long-run 
elasticity of 1.5 using a similar set up. Income elasticity above one is likely to reflect the 
omission of some variables from the model such as wealth or house purchases that are not 
captured by GDP transactions. The semi-elasticity of bank loans with respect to the 
composite lending rate β2 is negative (-4.3), in line with the findings of Calza et al. As for 
the second cointegrating vector, the mark-up µ is equal to 1.6 per cent over the period 
1985:1-1992:3 and 2.6 per cent during the period 1995:1-2005:4.  
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6. The Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model (AVECM) 
The model analysed so far is symmetric. However, as discussed in the introduction, 
credit is likely to react in a non-linear way to positive and negative policy shocks via the 
BLC or the BSC. This implies asymmetric adjustment of loans in both magnitude and speed, 
and therefore the multivariate framework described by (3) should be extended to allow for 
asymmetric behaviour in the loading coefficients (α) and in the lagged responses of 
variables in delta (Γ). 
Following Saikkonen (1992), Lim (2001), Calza and Zaghini (2006) and Gambacorta 
and Iannotti (2007), who use a similar framework, we assume that the intercepts and the 
elasticities of the long-run relationships do not vary across different monetary policy 
regimes. This means that in the long run the equilibrium in the credit market is unique. 
Preliminarily we test whether it is worthwhile to move from the symmetric model to 
the more general asymmetric model (Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger, 1994). This test is 
particularly useful because, if no significant gain is detected using the more general model, it 
is possible to stop further investigation. The test gives the result χ
2(105.28, 52)=0.00, which 
confirms the need for an asymmetric approach to the problem. 
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In this AVECM the two cointegrating vectors are normalized on c and l respectively. 
The constant term in the first long-run relationship (loan demand) is µ1, and in the second 
cointegrating vector (loan supply) the mark-up µ2, is divided into three parts (µ2,1, µ2,2 and 
µ2,3) in order to capture the structural changes discussed in the previous sections (the dummy 
variables c1 and c3 take the value 1 in the periods 1985:1-1992:3 and 1995:1-2005:4 and zero 
elsewhere;  c2 is a time trend only for the period 1992:4-1994:4 and is fixed at zero 
elsewhere). 
Parameters that refer to asymmetric behaviour are those with the superscript “*”. 
These are interacted with the dummy variable d, which captures the differential effects of 
increases and decreases in the monetary policy indicator. There are two possible stances of  
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monetary policy: monetary easing (a negative change in the rate) and monetary tightening (a 







0   if     0






In a few cases no quarterly changes are detected in the monetary indicator (∆iM=0). In 
these quarters a monetary easing (tightening) is considered, d=1(d=0), if the 3-month euribor 
rate decreases (increases), leading to easier (more difficult) access to interbank liquidity.  
7. Testing asymmetry and the reduced-form model 
According to Lim (2001) tests for asymmetry have been carried out considering the 
null hypothesis of zero restrictions on the dummy variables in the equations (4)-(7). Table 7 
summarizes the results.  
The test for asymmetry in the loading coefficients (see part A of Table 7) supports the 
hypothesis of a different adjustment to disequilibrium gaps only in the case of the lending 
supply curve relationship in the price equation ( 0 *
2 , ≠ p α ). The economic interpretation of 
this asymmetry is that, if an exogenous shock on supplied lending makes the interest rate on 
loans different from the long run equilibrium, the readjustment process of this cointegrating 
vector via prices takes place only in the case of a monetary tightening. On the contrary, in 
the case of a “loose” monetary policy the loading coefficient is close to zero and there is no 
readjustment at all ( 0 *
2 , 2 , ≅ + t p p d α α ). This behaviour calls for the existence of a “balance 
sheet channel” that is transmitted from asset prices to consumer prices due to “moral hazard 
and “adverse selection” problems. In other words credit-supply disequilibria contribute to 
lower prices during a monetary policy tightening while there are no (upside) effects on 
prices from the credit-supply side during an easing regime. 
It is worth mentioning that the model can be further simplified because the first 
cointegrating vector does not enter the lending equation and the second cointegrating vector 
does not directly affect the credit equation. The hypothesis αl,1= αl,1
*=0 implies that, given 
banking costs and risk premia, banks’ price adjustments are driven by monetary conditions.  
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The hypothesis αc,2 = αc,2
*
 = 0 implies that the quantity of credit in the long run is demand 
driven.
 5 
The test for asymmetry in the lagged terms (see part B of Table 7) gives information 
about the dynamic path of adjustment in the short run. The main result is that asymmetries in 
the lagged terms can not be set aside as they help to explain a large part of the overall 
asymmetry in the model. This role of asymmetries in the lagged terms is in line with the 
findings of Calza and Zaghini (2006), who use a similar framework to estimate the demand 
for M1 in the euro area. The results show that credit reacts asymmetrically to short-term 
changes in real GDP. In the case of a monetary “easing” leading to an increase in real GDP 
there is, other things being equal, a reduction in bank lending due to an increase in self-
financing. This is consistent with Melitz and Pardue (1973) and Friedman and Kuttner 
(1993) who stress that temporary increases in income are typically associated with a self-
financing effect that reduces the proportion of bank debt. There is also an asymmetry in the 
autoregressive part of the equation for GDP, which tends to smooth the effects of cumulative 
changes in real GDP in the case of a monetary easing.  
No significant asymmetries are detected in the equation for the lending rate, calling for 
the absence of particular frictions on banks’ price-setting behaviour. The lack of asymmetric 
effects is expected in the long run because of the mark-up equation that establishes a unique 
long run relationship between the monetary market indicator and the interest rate on lending 
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Lim, 2001). Nevertheless, in the short run, if a pure bank lending 
channel via loan supply is at work we should identify a greater reaction not only of 
quantities but also of banks’ prices in the case of a monetary tightening. However, 
coefficients 
*
,k p ϑ  turned out to be positive but low and not statistically significant.  
There are three possible explanations for the absence of such asymmetric effects on the 
interest rate on loans. First, as detected in some econometric works for Italy (Gambacorta, 
2005; Gambacorta and Iannotti, 2007), asymmetric monetary policy effects on lending rates 
vanish after some months so that the quarterly frequency of our data is not sufficient to 
capture this mechanism. Second, banks may tighten non-price elements of borrowing such as 
                                                           
5 The likelihood ratio test for αc,2 = αl,1= αc,2
*
 = αl,1
*=0 is given by χ
2(4)=4.07 with a p-value of 40 per cent.  
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real and personal guarantees, the loan-to-value ratio or other additional charges and 
commissions. Third, an asymmetric movement in lending demand may wash out the effect 
via loan supply. For example, if the monetary tightening causes a severe reduction in viable 
investment projects or a sharp reduction in firms’ self-financing (as discussed regarding the 
presence of coefficient φ
∗
2 in equation 4) these effects may produce a downward shift of 
demanded lending that counterbalances the effect on prices caused by the reduction in 
supplied lending, exacerbating the overall effects on quantity. 
Table 8 presents the results for the reduced four-equation system, including the 
significant asymmetric short-term effects. 
8. A simulation: adjustment to positive and negative shocks 
In order to evaluate the effect of an exogenous monetary policy shock, a simulation 
exercise is performed to generate time paths for the endogenous variables. Figure 6 presents 
the adjustment paths of lending, real GDP, composite lending rate and consumer prices to 
positive and negative changes in the money market rate. In particular, the policy experiment 
consists in increasing (decreasing) the money market rate by 25 basis points, starting from a 
base where the four equation system is in equilibrium. To make simulations more 
graphically comparable, the effects for easy monetary policy have been multiplied by -1. The 
main results are the following. 
In line with the credit view, the final effect of monetary policy on credit, real GDP 
and, particularly, prices
6 is larger in tight regimes than during easing. In particular, the effect 
on prices is consistent with the existence of a broad credit channel that works via a reduction 
of (asset) prices: a monetary squeeze increases debt service costs which can prompt sales of 
real assets, reducing their value and causing a loss of creditworthiness and a drop in lending. 
This result is in line with the “pushing on the string” view of monetary policy (see De Long 
and Summers, 1988; Karras, 1996), which explains the asymmetric effects of money on 
output and prices by arguing that negative money-supply shocks affect aggregate demand 
                                                           
6 The larger non-linear effect found for prices with respect to real GDP is in line with the results in Calza 
and Sousa (2006) who use a different approach to analyse credit regimes.  
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more than do positive shocks. It is worth mentioning that our result adds to this strand of 
literature by stressing the fact that the asymmetric movement of aggregate demand depends 
on a different adjustment of the credit market to negative and positive monetary policy 
shocks. 
This result can also be explained easily using a simple graphical representation of 
Bernanke and Blinder’s model. Using the CC line to indicate the contemporaneous 
equilibrium on the goods and credit markets and LM for the equilibrium in the money 
market, the economic system can be represented using a simple CC-LM, AD-AS scheme (see 
Figure 7). For example, an unexpected restrictive monetary policy not only moves the LM 
curve to LM
T, but also produces a shift of the CC towards CC
T, since money contraction 
works through the broad credit channel as well, reducing the loans available to the economy. 
In the case of a monetary easing that moves the LM curve to LM
E, if the CC shift is not very 
pronounced, the E
E equilibrium is found to have a lower impact than in the case of a 









9. Robustness checks 
The robustness of the results has been checked in several ways. The first test was to 
analyse the effects of a temporary 25 basis point change in money market rates on bank 
lending, real GDP, the composite lending rate and consumer prices. Part B of Table 9 reports 
the effects of this policy experiment after 2, 5 and 30 years, while part A presents, for the 
sake of comparison, the results obtained in the case of a permanent change (discussed in 
Section 8). As expected, “the pushing on a string” result still holds in the adjustment towards 
the new equilibrium: the effect of monetary policy on credit, real GDP and prices is still 
greater under tight monetary policy regimes than easy ones. 
Second, we have analysed the implications of endogenous adjustment of the monetary 
policy indicator (Table 9, part C). The assumption, made in Figure 6, of an exogenous and 
permanent change in the money market rate is obviously not realistic. We have therefore 
relaxed this hypothesis by allowing the money market rate to react to output and inflation  
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according to a simple Taylor rule.
7 When a reaction function for the policy-maker is 
accounted for, the asymmetry in the response of credit (both real and nominal) and prices to 
policy shocks is smaller than in the case without an interest rate reaction function, but still 
present. The rationale for this is that the movements in the monetary policy rate only 
partially offset the asymmetric behaviour in the transmission mechanism. In other words, 
even when the policy-maker is free to react to macroeconomic fluctuations, the response of 
output and prices to a policy shock is still larger in a tightening than in an easing regime. 
10. Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper supports the hypothesis that tight monetary policy 
has a larger effect on bank lending, real output and prices than easy monetary policy.  
From the point of view of theory, this result suggests the existence of a “broad credit 
channel” in the euro area: a rise in short-term interest rates makes loan supply shifts more 
pronounced because moral hazard and adverse selection problems increase the need for a 
bank to reduce credit risk and rebalance loan portfolios via a “flight to quality” effect; 
moreover, loan demand may also respond asymmetrically to changes in monetary policy due 
to a differential effect on investment decisions and self-financing. These mechanisms are in 
line with the “pushing on the string” view of monetary policy, which claims the existence of 
asymmetric aggregate demand movements depending on the sign of the monetary impulse. 
With regard to policy, the “pushing on a string” result reinforces the case for a 
conservative central bank that only cares about inflation (Rogoff, 1989). The lexicographical 
order in the ECB statute in favour of inflation is preferable because any attempt of the 
monetary authority to increase output has a limited effect. It is worth mentioning that this 
result is derived in a more general framework than the Keynesian liquidity trap. 
                                                           
7 The Taylor rule takes the form it=r+π
*+β(πt-π
*)+γ(yt-y
*), where r denotes the real interest rate (by 
assumption constant), π
*=∆p
* the central bank’s inflation objective and yt-y
* is the output gap, i.e. the 
percentage deviation of actual output from potential output. According to Taylor (1993) and Alesina et al. 
(2001) we set the coefficients r=2, π*=1.5, β=1.5 and γ=0.5. The annual increase of potential output is set 
equal to 2.25 per cent. The values of β and γ chosen to calibrate the Taylor rule are consistent with many of the 
empirical rules for Germany and Europe estimated using pre-EMU data.  
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Further research could be directed towards three additional issues. First, the analytical 
framework of the model could be used to analyse possible non-linearities in the response of 
bank lending to monetary policy shocks in single European countries, checking whether the 
degree of asymmetry varies among them. Second, a comparison could be carried out also 
with respect to the US. As stressed by Angeloni et al. (2003) the adjustment of euro area 
output in the wake of a monetary policy change appears to be primarily driven by investment 
changes. The evidence for the US is that monetary policy seems to have relatively stronger 
effect on consumption than on investment. This difference may be due to a stronger 
dependence of euro area firms on bank lending, while households in US are relatively more 
indebted. Third, the results of this paper could be replicated using different definitions of 
monetary policy stance. As pointed out in Section 6 and in line with Jacobs and Kakes 
(2000), we define the two possible stances of monetary policy according to the sign of the 
quarterly change in the short-term interest rate. Anyway, different approaches may be 
adopted to assess the degree of tightness and looseness of the monetary policy as, for 
instance, the interest rate gap or the developments of broad monetary condition indicators 
(Freedman, 1995).  






Tables and figures 
 Table 1 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON THE CREDIT MARKET IN THE EURO AREA (1) 
Paper Country    Method  Cointegrating equation(s)  Main conclusions 




Italy     (1984-
2003) 
Loans for house purchases and other 
loans are analysed separately. A SURE 
model (4 lags) is employed to estimate 
the two equations simultaneously. 
c
n,hh =y
n-0.04 ph+0.09 x+0.08 l
r,hh        
c
n,ho =C-0.02 l
r,ho                                 
 
One cointegrating relationship is detected in each equation. The 
equations are interpreted as the reduced form resulting from the 
equilibrium between demand and supply. The underlying hypothesis is 
that credit market is both demand and supply determined. The two 
schedules, however, are not disentangled in the paper.  
de Bandt, et 
al. (2006) 
 
9 euro area 
countries 
(1991-2005) 
A credit demand equation is estimated 
using a Pooled Mean Group estimator. 
According to this method credit demand 
of different countries shares a common 
equilibrium but is allowed for different 










Estimating the credit equation independently across countries often leads 
to the rejection of cointegration. Taking advantage of the panel 
dimension, however, a stable long-run relationship is found and can be 
constrained to be homogeneous in the long run for 7 European countries 
(including the 5 largest countries). The credit market is assumed to be 
demand determined.  





Starting from a 5-variable VECM (1 lag), 
the model is then reduced to one credit 
equation (as all the variables, except 
credit, are found to be weakly 




n,e-E)                            (1) 
I
n,e=0.46 E                                          (2) 
l
n,e=igov
n                                             (3) 
Three cointegrating relationships are found: (1) is interpreted as the 
credit demand; (2) is the relationship between investment expenditure 
and firms’ borrowing requirement; (3) in the long run the lending rate 
equals the risk free government bond yield. The underlying hypothesis is 
that the credit market is both demand and supply determined. The 
credit supply schedule is flat; banks are price-makers that behave as in 






Long-term and short-term loans to 
corporate sector are analysed using two 
VECM models (4 lags). All variables are 
treated as endogenous. 









n)                       (2) 




n,e                              (3) 
Two cointegrating relationships are found in the short term loan model 
(credit demand (1) and supply (2)). In the model for long term loans only 




Italy       
(1988-2003) 
Starting from a 4-variable VECM (4 
lags), the model is then reduced to two 
equations as k and (l
n,e-i
n,e) are found to 







   One cointegrating relationship is detected. It represents the equilibrium 
between demand and supply. The two schedules, however, are not 
disentangled.  Table 1 (continued) 
 
Paper Country  Method  Cointegrating equation(s)  Main conclusions 






A 4-variable VECM (4 lags) is used. 









n)                   (2) 
Two cointegrating relationships are found and are interpreted as the 
credit demand (1) and the credit supply equilibrium (2). Shifts in the 
credit supply schedule do not have a direct significant impact on credit 
(the loadings of the cointegrating vector are not significant in the credit 




8 euro area 
countries 
(1980-1998) 
A 4-variable VECM is estimated for 
different countries. All variables are 
endogenous. The lags vary depending 






(values of the β vector vary across 
countries) 
Without the inclusion of p
re within the set of the endogenous variables 
the model fails to detect cointegrating relationships. The inclusion of p
re 
allows the identification of one long-run relationship in all countries 
except Germany. The cointegrating vector is interpreted as the credit 





A 5-variable VECM (4 lags) is used. 
PY and eq
r are found to be weakly 
exogenous.   
c
n,ps  =0.9 PY- 0.2 l
n,ps                        (1) 
c
r,ps  =0.1 (l
n,ps-i
n)+0.8 eq
r                     (2)
Two cointegrating relationships are found and are interpreted as the 
credit demand and the credit supply equilibrium. Credit reacts only 
slowly in the direction of the long-run credit demand and supply 
equation (the loadings of the two cointegrating vectors are not 
significant in the credit equation). Supply effects are significant 
through their impact on lending rate 




4-variables VECM (4 lags). The 





n +5.9 π   One cointegrating relationship is detected and it is interpreted as the 
credit demand equilibrium. The credit market is demand driven. 
Explanatory note: (1) All papers use quarterly data. Superscripts have the following meaning: n refers to nominal variables and r to real variables. As for sectors, e indicates enterprises, h 
households (hh for housing finance ho for other purposes), ps private sector. As for variables, according to the definition in Section 2, c refers to loans, y to GDP, l to the lending rate, p to the 
consumer price index and i to the short-term interest rate. As for other symbols, ph is the house price index,  x is the equity price index, C is consumption expenditure, H is housing 
investment, I is investment expenditure and E is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, igov is the interest rate on government bonds up to one year, π is the inflation 
rate, PY is the private share of real GDP, eq is the banks equity position and k is firms’ capital stock. As a general rule, all variables are in logs with the exclusion of interest rates and ratios.  
Table 2 
 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS 
 
Three models are compared: Model C which includes a trend and a constant, Model B, which includes a constant and Model A, which has no deterministic 
components. Starting from the more general model the progressive tests establish what is the most appropriate deterministic component (Model C → 
Model B → Model A). The lagged differences in the models are included to obtain white noise residuals. The length of the lag (p*) used in the model for 
each series is chosen by comparing three different information criteria (Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn and Final Prediction Error), taking into consideration the 
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c  2  -3.19 3.22 5.10 -0.39 0.68 2.44  2.08 
y  4  -3.07 3.09 5.76 -1.75 1.83 4.68  2.30 
l  1  -2.20 1.99 2.45 -0.91 0.53 1.23  -1.46 
p  4  -1.85 1.90 2.60 -1.73 1.81 2.17  0.98 
i  1  -2.08 1.73 2.17 -1.13 0.49 1.31  -1.52 
5%  -3.45 3.11 6.49 -2.89 2.54 4.71  -1.95  Critical 
values  1%  -4.04 3.78 8.73 -3.51 3.22  6.7  -2.61 
 Table 3 
LAG ORDER DETERMINATION 
 
Information criteria: AK=Akaike, SC=Schwarz and HQ=Hannan-Quinn. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) is computed 
taking into account the small sample correction suggested by Sims (1980). GODF=Godfrey portmanteau test for 









df p-value AK  HQ  SC  GODF 
p-value 
1 n.a.  25  n.a.  138.0  75  0.00  -57.23  -56.94  -56.54*  0.00 
2  74.8 25  0.00 73.8 50  0.02  -57.67  -57.09  -56.24  0.04 
3  50.1 25  0.00*  27.5 25  0.33*  -57.81* -56.94* -55.63  0.20* 





JARQUE-BERA NORMALITY TESTS 
 
Equation Skewness p-value  Kurtosis  p-value Skewness 
& Kurtosis 
p-value 
c  0.59 0.44 4.08 0.04 4.66 0.10 
y  0.05 0.82 0.07 0.79 0.12 0.94 
l  2.21 0.14 0.01 0.94 2.21 0.33 
p  0.39 0.53 5.03 0.03 5.42 0.07 
i  0.66 0.42 0.39 0.53 1.05 0.59 
system 3.89 0.57  9.69 0.09 13.57 0.19 
(1) Normality is accepted when the p-value is larger than 5 per cent. 
 Table 5 
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
Test for the cointegration rank of the models. ** denotes rejection at the 1 per cent significance level; 
* denotes rejection at the 5 per cent significance level. Johansen λ-trace tests take into account the 
adjustment for degrees of freedom proposed by Reimers (1992) for small samples. In order to make 
the test consistent with the presence of a point dummy in the model, asymptotic critical values, 
reported below, are calculated with the approach suggested by Johansen and Nielsen (1993). The 
asymptotic estimates of the critical values involve 100,000 simulations with 800 steps in the 
approximation to Brownian motion. 
  H0: r=0 H0: r≤1 H0: r≤2 H0: r≤3  H0: r≤4 
Trace Statistic  122.55**  64.01**  32.28  9.44  3.66 
5% critical val.  75.1  52.6  33.8  19.1  7.3 
 
Constrained cointegrating vectors 
(standard errors in brackets) 
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H0: weak exogeneity of   LR test  P-value 
c  17.75 0.00 
y  9.20 0.01 
l  7.46 0.02 
p  22.96 0.00 
i  4.43 0.11 
(1) Weak exogeneity is accepted when the p-value is larger than 5 per cent.  
Table 7 
TESTS FOR ASYMMETRY  
 
The symbols ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level of 
the non-linear coefficient. The asymmetries are rejected when the p-value is larger 
than 0.05. 
 1985:01-2005:04 
  LR statistic  P-value 
A. Testing asymmetry in the 
loading coefficients 
  
α*c,1 =α*c,2= 0  0.65 0.72 
α*y,1 =α*y,2= 0  2.77 0.25 
α*l,1 =α*l,2= 0  1.55 0.46 
α*p,1 =α*p,2= 0  14.10 0.00  *** 
    
B. Testing asymmetry in the 
short-term terms  
  



























c,2=0  2.95 0.40   



























y,2=0  1.98 0.58 



























l,2=0  5.23 0.16 



























p,2=0  4.14 0.25 
    
 
 Table 8 
 
COEFFICIENTS OF THE MODEL IN REDUCED FORM 
 
The reduction from the general model represented by equations (4)-(7) to this reduced-form model has been 
carried out according to Lim, 2001. Asymmetric coefficients, as from Table 7, have been removed from the 
reduced model when statistically not significant (10% level). Standard errors in brackets. The symbols ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. Coefficients and standard errors for the dummies are 
not reported.  











α 1  -0.046 (0.01)*** -0.051  (0.01) ***     0.021 (0.00) *** 
α 2   -0.120  (0.13) -0.196  (0.06) ***   0.262 (0.09)*** 
α
*
2     -0.263  (0.10) ** 
µ 1   4.342 (0.68) ***   4.342 (0.68) ***   4.342 (0.68) ***   4.342 (0.68) *** 
µ 2,1  -0.015 (0.00) ***  -0.015 (0.00) ***  -0.015 (0.00) ***  -0.015 (0.00) *** 
µ 2,2  -0.005 (0.00) ***  -0.005 (0.00) *** -0.005  (0.00 )*** -0.005  (0.00) *** 
µ 2,3  -0.027 (0.00) ***  -0.027 (0.00) ***  -0.027 (0.00) *** -0.027  (0.00) *** 
β 1,1  -1.179 (0.09) ***  -1.179 (0.09) ***  -1.179 (0.09) ***  -1.179 (0.09) *** 
β 1,2   5.461 (0.52) ***   5.461  (0.52) ***   5.461 (0.52) ***   5.461 (0.52) *** 
δ 1   0.417 (0.11) ***       0.190 (0.03) *** 
δ 2   0.035 (0.12) ***       
φ1   0.088 (0.08)      
φ2  -0.043 (0.11) -0.395  (0.14) ***     
φ
∗
2  -0.266 (0.12) **   0.446 (0.15) ***     
ψ1     0.177  (0.31)   0.123  (0.10)   0.049  (0.12) 
ψ 2    -0.077  (0.09)  
ξ1   0.224 (0.16)   0.660  (0.17) ***     
ξ2   0.647 (0.15) ***   0.640 (0.18) ***     0.367 (0.13) *** 
θ0     0.394  (0.12) ***   0.474 (0.04) ***   
θ1   -0.036  (0.14)   0.033 (0.06) -0.056  (0.08) 
  
 Table 9 
 
RESPONSE OF THE ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE TO  
CHANGES IN THE MONETARY POLICY INDICATOR 
(Percentage values and basis points) 
In this table we carry out three simulation exercises. Panel A summarizes the responses of the 
endogenous variables to a 25pb permanent change in the exogenous money market interest rate. 
Panel B shows how the same variables react to a 25pb temporary (one year) change in the money 
market interest rate. Lastly Panel C shows the reaction of the endogenous variables after a 
temporary 25bp change in the exogenous money market rate when a Taylor rule is accounted for.
    25bp increase  25bp decrease 
  Series  2 years  5 years  30 years 2 years  5 years  30 years
c  -0.98  -3.80  -5.87 0.59 1.76 3.94 
y  -0.28  -0.97  -1.57 0.07 0.53 1.53 
l  0.23  0.25  0.25 -0.23 -0.25 -0.25 
A. Permanent 
change 
p  -0.18 -0.89 -2.83 -0.04  0.09  0.77 
c  -0.69  -0.97  -0.01 0.36 0.38 0.00 
y  -0.20  -0.24 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.00 
l  0.03 0.00 0.00  -0.03 0.00 0.00 
B. Temporary 
change 
p  -0.10  -0.30 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 
c  -0.58  -0.44  -0.04 0.39 0.24 0.02 
y  -0.11  -0.10  -0.01 0.18 0.11 0.01 
l  -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
p  -0.07  -0.18  -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 
C. Taylor rule  
i  -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
 
 
 Figure 1  
Credit and the business cycle  
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Source: ECB, Eurostat and national statistics. 
 
Figure 2  
Consumer price index 
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Source: ECB and Calza (2006). 
Figure 4  












Source: ECB, Calza (2006) and authors’ calculations. Figure 5  
Spread behaviour in the four major euro area countries 



















































Source: IFS and ECB. Annual data and percentage values. Data are not harmonized and therefore we may infer 




















































Adjustment paths to positive and negative 
changes in the monetary policy indicator 
(percentage values) 
Note: The experiment consists in evaluating the effect after 70 quarters of a 25basis point permanent change in the monetary policy indicator. The symbol T represents 
a monetary tightening, the symbol E a monetary easing. To make simulations more comparable the effects for easing monetary policy are multiplied by -1.Figure 7 
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